Ideas from 'Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology' by Ross P. Cameron [2008], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics' (ed/tr Le Poidevin,R) [CUP 2008,978-0-521-73544-5]].
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
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18877
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Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
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18868
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Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are?
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
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18867
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Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth
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18873
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God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
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18879
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What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker
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18880
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Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc
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18874
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Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
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18869
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Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
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18870
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Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable
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18871
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I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
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18881
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For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world
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18875
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Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true
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18878
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Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
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18872
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We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds
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